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By Any Means Necessary? The FCC’s Implementation of Net Neutrality
- Dawn C. Nunziato1
[W]e say to the public that there is a place, the FCC, where you can come to have
allegations of network neutrality violations heard and acted upon.2

Introduction
Since the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) removed common
carriage obligations3 from Internet cable broadband providers in 2002, free speech and
open access advocates have been lamenting the FCC’s market-oriented, laissez-faire
approach and have called for net neutrality regulation to remedy the problems brought
about by an unregulated market for Internet communications. Such regulation would
reimpose some of the common carriage/non-discrimination obligations historically
imposed on telecommunications providers and would prohibit broadband providers from
censoring, blocking, or otherwise discriminating against any legal content or applications
that users sought to communicate via broadband pipes. In August 2008, however, the
FCC reversed its laissez-faire course and censured Comcast—one of the nation’s largest
broadband providers—for engaging in discriminatory network management practices. In
its Comcast4 order, the FCC condemned Comcast’s practice of engaging in the
clandestine blocking of certain peer-to-peer file-sharing applications and ordered it to
discontinue these and other “unreasonable” network management practices and to come
clean with the public about the ways in which it manages communications on its
network.5
Some have argued that the FCC’s willingness to act in these circumstances
obviates the need for general net neutrality regulation or for broadly-applicable
rulemaking by the FCC.6 In this Article, I contend that, while these recent actions by the
FCC are a step in the right direction, the FCC’s ad hoc, ex post adjudication actions stand
on uneasy jurisdictional footing and, in any case, are insufficient to remedy fully the
problems caused by the FCC’s removing nondiscrimination obligations from broadband
providers in the first place—most significantly, the harm to the free flow of expression on
1
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the Internet. In Part I of this Article, I describe the uneven history of the FCC’s
regulatory treatment of Internet service providers (ISPs). In Part II, I analyze the
Comcast network management practices that were the subject of the FCC’s August 2008
order, as well as the order itself. In particular, I scrutinize the FCC’s asserted basis for
claiming jurisdiction to adjudicate such actions by broadband providers, in light of the
fact that the FCC had previously classified such providers as subject to minimal
regulatory oversight. In Part III, I contend that—notwithstanding the order and the
FCC’s apparent willingness of late to impose checks on broadband providers’ censorial
and discriminatory conduct—broadly applicable, ex ante legislative or agency action is
necessary to impose general nondiscrimination obligations on broadband providers.
Congress should enact net neutrality legislation to prohibit broadband providers from
discriminating against legal content or applications in the form of censoring or degrading
such expression, or should require the FCC to adopt binding, generally-applicable rules
prohibiting such discrimination.
I.

Regulation (and Deregulation) of Internet Service Providers:
The FCC’s Decisions Exempting Broadband Providers from the Common Carriage
Obligations Historically Imposed on Conduits for Communication
From the beginning of the mass communications era, the United States imposed
“common carrier” obligations on certain powerful private entities engaged in providing
transportation for, and facilitating the communications of, the public to facilitate the free
flow of commerce and information free of censorship or discrimination.7 Through the
common carriage doctrine, the government, by way of legislation and the common law,
imposed nondiscrimination duties on entities providing transportation and facilitating
communication for the public, like telephone companies and the postal service.8 Rather
than granting communications and telecommunications providers the discretion to
regulate speech however they see fit, the common carriage doctrine requires that such
conduits not discriminate among the communications they are charged with carrying.9
As the Internet grew to become an increasingly popular medium of communication, the
question how to regulate those who facilitated Internet communications arose.10 In the
formative years of the Internet’s development, the FCC regulated ISPs—including
narrowband and Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) providers—as common carriers subject
(inter alia) to nondiscrimination obligations.11 Yet in 2002, the FCC began a process of
removing such obligations from providers of broadband Internet access.12 This course of
removing such obligations from broadband providers was approved by the United States
Supreme Court in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
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Services.13 Below, I outline the evolution of the FCC’s deregulation of Internet conduits
for communication.
In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress granted the FCC the authority to
regulate telephone companies as common carriers.14 The common carriage obligations
imposed on telecommunications providers ensured that the public had a right to
communicate via telephone free from discrimination by the telephone companies.15 In
the 1970s, as telephone companies began offering other types of services in addition to
serving as conduits for telephone conversations, the FCC articulated a framework to
distinguish between their conduit function and the value-added services that they offered.
In a series of three “Computer Inquiry” decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, the FCC
established essentially the following two categories of services: (1) basic services—those
that “offer[ed] . . . transmission capacity for the movement of information”—which were
regulated as common carriers16 and (2) “enhanced” or value-added services—those that
“combin[ed] basic service with computer processing applications that act on the . . .
subscriber’s transmitted information, or provide the subscriber additional, different, or
restructured information, or involve subscriber interaction with stored information”—
which were not regulated as common carriers.17
In its passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,18 Congress revised the
categorization of services subject to common carriage regulation. Under the 1996 Act,
“telecommunications services” were made subject to common carriage regulation
(replacing the category of “basic services”), while “information services” were exempted
from mandatory common carriage regulation (replacing the exempt category of
“enhanced services”).19 While the Act maintained significant common carrier obligations
on providers of telecommunications services, it left information services providers
subject to far less stringent regulation.20 Such services were merely subject to regulation
under the FCC’s amorphous ancillary jurisdiction—i.e., its jurisdiction to impose
additional regulatory obligations ancillary to its jurisdiction to regulate interstate and
foreign communications.21
A central issue in interpreting the Telecommunications Act was how, if at all, the
provision of broadband Internet access by cable providers (and of broadband access more
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generally) should be regulated.22 If regulated as telecommunications services, broadband
providers would be subject to common carriage regulation, which would prohibit them
from, among other things, discriminating against any legal content or applications (and
would also require them to allow interconnection by unaffiliated ISPs).23 If regulated
instead as providers of information services, broadband providers would be exempt from
common carriage obligations and would be subject only to the FCC’s ancillary
jurisdiction. When it enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress did not
resolve this question and presumably vested the FCC with the discretion to make this
determination.
In passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress also set forth several
broad tenets of federal Internet policy. On one hand, the Act provides that the Internet
should be allowed to flourish in a “minimal regulatory environment”24 characterized by a
“free market . . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”25 On the other hand, the Act
articulates the federal Internet policy of “maximiz[ing] user control over what
information is received by individuals . . .who use the Internet.”26 A conflict arises—as it
did in the Comcast adjudication27—when maximizing Internet users’ control over what
Internet content or applications they will receive requires regulation of ISPs.
In determining how to regulate broadband providers, the FCC was required to
decide whether to place them under the same regulatory framework as narrowband
providers. Providers of narrowband Internet access offer connection via traditional
telephone lines and are regulated as telecommunications services subject to common
carrier regulation under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.28 Over the past ten years,
however, as Internet technology has advanced, many Internet users have migrated from
the dial-up, narrowband universe to broadband technologies, which provide vastly faster
Internet access.29 The predominant broadband technologies used by residential Internet
users are provided via high-speed cable modems and DSL.30 Because DSL broadband
Internet access is provided via telephone lines, the provision of this service was initially
regulated as a telecommunications service subject to common carriage
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/nondiscrimination regulations.31 The regulation of broadband access via cable, however,
proved to be a more complicated question. Cable broadband providers were not
providing traditional telecommunications services and traditionally cable providers were
providing their own choice of content to users via one-way connections.32 Yet, as they
upgraded their wires to allow for two-way Internet communications, they began to
provide services that looked like traditional telecommunications conduit services.33 If
cable broadband providers essentially served as conduits for the Internet content
originated by others—in the same way that narrowband and DSL providers did–
regulatory parity would dictate that they be subject to the same types of common
carriage/non-discrimination obligations as were dial-up and DSL providers. But the
principle of regulatory parity did not carry the day.
The FCC’s 2002 Declaratory Ruling Exempting Cable Broadband From Common
Carriage Regulation
In 2000, the FCC initiated a rulemaking proceeding to determine how to apply the
Telecommunications Act’s classifications to cable broadband providers. In its 2002
declaratory ruling, “Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and
Other Facilities”34, the FCC concluded that cable broadband was an “information service”
with “no separate offering of telecommunications service.”35 Having concluded that cable
companies do not provide telecommunications services when they offer broadband cable
Internet services, the FCC ruled that the provision of such services was outside the scope
of Title II’s mandatory common carriage regulatory framework.36 The FCC ruled that the
provision of cable broadband service does not contain a separate telecommunications
service because the transmission of the Internet user’s communications is “part and
parcel” of that information service, and is integral to its capabilities.37 As an information
service with “no separate offering of telecommunications service,”38 cable operators’
provision of broadband Internet access was exempt from the common carrier regulations
of Title II and was subject only to the FCC’s “Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate
interstate and foreign communications.”39 The FCC based its decision, in part, on the
policy judgment that “broadband services should exist in a minimal regulatory
environment that promotes investment and innovation in a competitive market.”40 Yet,
notwithstanding its conclusion that cable broadband was exempt from Title II common
carriage regulation, the FCC solicited comments in a companion notice of proposed
rulemaking regarding whether it should, under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction, require
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cable companies to provide open access and to offer other ISPs access to their facilities on
common-carrier terms.41
The FCC’s decision to exempt cable broadband from common carriage
obligations was challenged by non-facilities-based ISPs that sought open access and
asserted the right to interconnect with cable providers’ pipelines.42 These ISPs sought a
ruling that cable broadband providers should be regulated as providers of
telecommunications services subject to common carriage obligations.43 In its 2005 Brand
X decision, the Supreme Court held that the FCC enjoyed the discretion to interpret the
Telecommunications Act, as it had done in its Declaratory Ruling, to decline to subject
cable operators’ provision of broadband Internet access—or the provision of any other
type of broadband Internet access—to common carriage/nondiscrimination obligations. 44
The Supreme Court also explained that the FCC enjoyed the authority under its ancillary
jurisdiction to regulate broadband providers—even while not regulating them as common
carriers—if necessary to advance the federal government’s and the FCC’s general
policies in the Internet realm.45 Such amorphous and unfettered ancillary jurisdiction and
discretion, however, have proved problematic, as is evident in the FCC’s recent exercise
of this authority.
The Brand X Decision
In Brand X, the Supreme Court set into motion a course of events that led to the
FCC’s recent adjudicatory actions. The Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that
the FCC’s interpretation of the Communications Act, as amended by the
Telecommunications Act, did not require it to revisit its earlier holding46 that cable
broadband was subject to common carriage regulation under Title II.47 The Ninth Circuit
held that the FCC could not permissibly construe the Communications Act to exempt
cable broadband from Title II common carriage regulation.48 The Supreme Court
reversed.49
In a rare parting of ways between Justices Thomas, who authored the opinion of
the Court, and Scalia, who issued a scathing dissent, Justice Thomas first explained that
as a matter of administrative law, the Ninth Circuit erred in failing to apply Chevron
deference50 to the FCC’s Declaratory Ruling.51 Under Chevron, a federal court is
41
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45
Id. at 976.
46
AT&T v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
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permitted to substitute its construction of the statute for the agency’s only if it concludes
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute.52 Because the
Ninth Circuit had concluded merely that its reading was the best reading—not the only
permissible reading—of the statute, the Ninth Circuit’s construction could not trump the
FCC’s construction of the statute.53
The Supreme Court first held that the Telecommunications Act was ambiguous as
to whether cable broadband providers were providers of telecommunications services.54
While cable companies use “telecommunications” to provide consumers with Internet
service, they were not necessarily offering telecommunications services, according to the
Court.55 Rather, the Court credited the FCC’s reasoning that whether the service
included a telecommunications offering “‘turn[ed] on the nature of the functions the end
user is offered.’”56 Seen from the end user’s perspective, cable broadband is not a
telecommunications service because “the consumer uses the high-speed wire always in
connection with the information-processing capabilities provided by Internet access, and
because the transmission is a necessary component of Internet access.”57 According to
the FCC’s analysis (credited by the Court), end users make use of the wire provided by
cable companies in order to “access the World Wide Web, newsgroups, and so forth,
rather than ‘transparently’ to transmit and receive . . . messages without computer
processing or storage of the message.”58 Because such communications were always
integrated with computer processing and storage, the FCC permissibly concluded that
“cable modem service was not a ‘stand-alone,’ transparent offering of
telecommunications.”59 The Court rejected the argument that cable companies providing
Internet service necessarily also provide telecommunications service because they
provide the underlying telecommunications used to transmit Internet services:
Cable companies in the broadband Internet service business “offe[r]”
consumers an information service in the form of Internet access and they
do so “via telecommunications,” but it does not inexorably follow as a
matter of ordinary language that they also “offe[r]” consumers . . .
(telecommunications) that is an input used to provide this service. . . .
....

a federal court must accept the agency’s construction even if it differs from what the court
believes is the best statutory interpretation).
51
Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980-82.
52
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.
53
Brand X, 545 U.S. at 984-85.
54
Id. at 986.
55
Id. at 989.
56
Id. at 988 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet
Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4822 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of
proposed rulemaking)).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
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The question . . . is whether the transmission component of cable modem
service is sufficiently integrated with the finished service to make it
reasonable to describe the two as a single, integrated offering. We think
that they are sufficiently integrated . . . . Such functionally integrated
components need not be described as distinct “offerings.”60
Justice Thomas concluded that, because of ambiguities in the statutory language, it was
permissible for the FCC to determine that the transmission component of cable modem
service was sufficiently integrated with the complete service it offered such that it was
reasonable to describe the combination as a single, integrated offering that constituted an
information service with no separate offering of a telecommunications service.61
Applying Chevron’s second step, the Court concluded that the FCC’s construction
was reasonable.62 It rejected the argument that the FCC’s construction was unreasonable
because it would allow Internet communications providers to evade common carriage
obligations historically imposed on other conduits for communication.63 It also rejected
the argument that the FCC’s interpretation was arbitrary and capricious because it left
providers of broadband Internet access via DSL subject to common carriage requirements
while removing such requirements from cable broadband providers.64 The Court held
that the FCC enjoyed the discretion gradually to alter telecommunications policy so as to
eventually exempt the provision of all broadband Internet access from common carriage
requirements.65 As a consolation to open access and net neutrality advocates, however,
the Court concluded that the FCC “remains free to impose special regulatory duties on
[broadband providers] under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction.”66
Justice Scalia, dissenting, offered a harsh critique of the FCC’s interpretation and
newly-proclaimed (and seemingly unconstrained) freedom to regulate broadband
providers under its ancillary jurisdiction.67 Scalia’s critique anticipates the problems
inherent in the FCC’s recent exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction in the Comcast order.68
According to Justice Scalia, cable broadband providers clearly offer telecommunications
services and to hold otherwise and permit them to evade common carriage obligations
was nonsensical.69 He rejected the interpretation advanced by the FCC: that cable
broadband providers’ bundling of telecommunications services with value-added services
meant that they should not be classified as providers of telecommunications services:
60

Id. at 989-91 (citations omitted).
Id. at 990-91.
62
Id. at 997.
63
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64
Id. at 1000-02.
65
Id. at 1002.
66
Id. at 996.
67
Id. at 1013-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68
Id. See Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13028 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order)
(holding that Comcast’s “discriminatory and arbitrary practice . . . does not constitute reasonable
network management,” and ordering Comcast to cease such practice).
69
Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1006-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61
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The relevant question is whether the individual components in a
package being offered still possess sufficient identity to be
described as separate objects of the offer, or whether they have
been so changed by their combination with the other
components that it is no longer reasonable to describe them in
that way.
. . . There are instances in which it is ridiculous to deny that
one part of a joint offering is being offered merely because it is
not offered on a “‘stand-alone’” basis.
If, for example, I call up a pizzeria and ask whether they offer
delivery, both common sense and common “usage” would
prevent them from answering: “No, we do not offer delivery—
but if you order a pizza from us, we’ll bake it for you and then
bring it to your house.” The logical response to this would be
something on the order of, “so, you do offer delivery.” But our
pizza-man may continue to deny the obvious and explain,
paraphrasing the FCC and the Court: “No, even though we
bring the pizza to your house, we are not actually ‘offering’ you
delivery, because the delivery that we provide to our end users
is ‘part and parcel’ of our pizzeria-pizza-at-home service and is
‘integral to its other capabilities.’” Any reasonable customer
would conclude at that point that his interlocutor was either
crazy or following some too-clever-by-half legal advice.
....
Despite the Court’s mighty labors to prove otherwise, the
telecommunications component of cable-modem service retains
such ample independent identity that it must be regarded as
being on [sic] offer –especially when seen from the perspective
of the consumer or the end user. 70
In other words, even though cable broadband providers provide some information services
in addition to the telecommunications services they offer, it was irrational to conclude that
there is no separately identifiable offering of telecommunications service that is subject to
common carriage regulation.
The discretion that the FCC purported to reserve to regulate the provision of
broadband Internet services under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction was also subjected to
Justice Scalia’s trenchant criticism:

70

Id. at 1006-08 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

9

This [unfettered ancillary jurisdiction] is a wonderful
illustration of how an experienced agency can (with some
assistance from credulous courts) turn statutory constraints into
bureaucratic discretions. The main source of the Commission’s
regulatory authority over common carriers is Title II, but the
Commission has rendered that inapplicable in this instance by
concluding that the definition of “telecommunications service”
is ambiguous and does not (in its current view) apply to cablemodem service. It contemplates, however, altering that
(unnecessary) outcome, not by changing the law (i.e., its
construction of the Title II definitions), but by reserving the
right to change the facts. Under its undefined and sparingly
used “ancillary” powers, the Commission might conclude that it
can
order
cable
companies
to
“unbundle”
the
telecommunications component of cable-modem service. And
presto, Title II will then apply to them, because they will finally
be “offering” telecommunications service! . . . Such Möbiusstrip reasoning mocks the principle that the statute constrains
the agency in any meaningful way.71
Within three years of the Brand X decision, the FCC determined that it indeed enjoyed
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate a cable broadband provider.72 Below, I explore the
actions of the FCC and of broadband providers that led to this result, as well as the
problems arising from the FCC’s exercise of this unconstrained ancillary jurisdiction.
After the Brand X decision, the FCC removed common carriage regulations from
every other type of broadband provider,73 as the Court’s opinion authorized it to do.74
One month after Brand X was handed down, the FCC ruled that the provision of
broadband Internet access via DSL, like cable broadband, was also an “information
service,” and therefore that telephone companies’ provision of broadband Internet access
via DSL would be exempt from common carriage requirements.75 The FCC subsequently
ruled that all other types of broadband are likewise exempt from common
carriage/nondiscrimination regulations.76 Thus, under the Telecommunications Act,
71

Id. at 1013-14.
See Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13034-36.
73
See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20
F.C.C.R. 14853, 14858 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order] (report and order and
notice of proposed rulemaking). See also NUNZIATO, supra note 7, at 126 (discussing the
Wireline Broadband Order).
74
See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1002-03.
75
See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 73, at 14858. For transition purposes, the Wireline
Broadband Order required DSL providers to “continue to provide existing wireline broadband
Internet access transmission offerings, on a grandfathered basis, to unaffiliated ISPs” for one year
after the date of the order’s publication of September 23, 2005. Id.
76
Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 73, at 14858. See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Neither Fish nor
Fowl: New Strategies for Selective Regulation of Information Services, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 373 (2008).
72
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decisions about what expression to censor and what expression to facilitate were left to
solely to the discretion of the companies providing broadband Internet access—for most
residential Internet users, the cable/telephone duopoly.77
The FCC’s 2005 Broadband Policy Statement
When the FCC exempted DSL providers from common carriage/nondiscrimination obligations, at least one of the FCC Commissioners was troubled by the
implications of this course of action. Commissioner Michael Copps, a long-time
advocate of net neutrality principles, managed to prevail upon his colleagues to adopt a
statement of broadband policy setting forth Internet users’ basic rights.78 Accordingly,
shortly after the Brand X decision, on the same day that it exempted DSL providers from
common carriage requirements, the FCC Commissioners issued a Broadband Policy
Statement (Policy Statement) setting forth four principles regarding consumers’ access
to the Internet:
•

consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their
choice[;]

•

. . . consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of
their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement[;]

•

. . . consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices
that do not harm the network[;]

•

. . . consumers are entitled to competition among network providers,
application and service providers, and content providers.79

The legal force of these principles is unclear, and the uncertain status of the
principles further contributes to the uncertainty surrounding the FCC’s recent actions
regulating broadband providers to ensure their compliance with these principles. On one
hand, in the Policy Statement, the FCC recognized that it has “a duty to preserve and
77

According to the FCC’s 2006 data, about ninety-five percent of all residential broadband is
provided by the cable/telephone duopoly. See INDUSTRY ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY
DIVISION, WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES
FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2006 9 tbl.3, chart 6 (2007), available at
http://www.masstech.org/broadband/FCC07data.pdf.
78
See Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13078 (2008) (Copps, Comm’r, concurring)
(memorandum opinion and order) (“[After the Brand X decision gave the Supreme Court’s stamp
of approval on the 2002 Declaratory Ruling], the Commission was more interested in recategorizing telecommunications services as information services and eliminating many of the
social and economic responsibilities of broadband service providers. I urged my colleagues to at
least adopt an Internet Policy Statement that contained the basic rights of Internet end-users . . .
.”).
79
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20
F.C.C.R. 14986, 14988 (2005) [hereinafter Policy Statement] (policy statement).
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promote the vibrant and open character of the Internet as the telecommunications
marketplace enters the broadband age,” and, in order to do so, promised to “incorporate
the above principles into its ongoing policymaking activities.”80 In so doing, the FCC
arguably provided notice to broadband providers of its intent to adjudicate or enact rules
in accord with these policies. The FCC made clear that if it encountered “evidence that
providers of telecommunications for Internet access . . . are violating these principles, [it
would] not hesitate to take action to address that conduct.”81 Indeed, the FCC and others
opposed to net neutrality legislation have referred to the FCC’s power to enforce these
principles to support the argument that net neutrality legislation is unnecessary.82
On the other hand, the FCC expressly stated that in adopting the Policy Statement,
it was not adopting formal rules.83 The principles set forth in the Broadband Policy
Statement were rendered even fuzzier by the FCC’s caveat that the rights of Internet users
articulated therein were “subject to reasonable network management”84 by broadband
providers (without any articulation of what types of deviations from the principles would
be excused as “reasonable network management”). As such, the Policy Statement
appears to embody a compromise among different factions of the FCC regarding the legal
force and effect of the rights and principles it embodies. After the release of the Policy
Statement, it was unclear exactly how (if at all) the FCC would enforce the rights
articulated in the Policy Statement.
The FCC’s First (and Incomplete) Steps Toward Broadband Rulemaking
Two years after it adopted the Broadband Policy Statement, the FCC took
preliminary steps toward a formal rulemaking that would set forth a regulatory
framework applicable to providers of broadband Internet access. In 2007, the FCC
adopted a Broadband Industry Practices Notice of Inquiry—typically the first step in a
rulemaking proceeding—designed to determine whether to articulate broadly-applicable
and enforceable net neutrality rules governing network management practices, to
elucidate the scope of its authority to regulate broadband providers, and to develop a
factual record on which to determine whether such rules were necessary.85 In particular,
the FCC sought inquiry on the following matters:
[W]e seek to enhance our understanding of the nature of the market for
broadband and related services, whether network platform providers and
others favor or disfavor particular content, how consumers are affected by
80
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these policies, and whether consumer choice of broadband providers is
sufficient to ensure that all such policies ultimately benefit consumers.
We ask for specific examples of beneficial or harmful behavior, and we
ask whether any regulatory intervention is necessary.
....
We seek a fuller understanding of the behavior of broadband market
participants today . . . [D]o providers treat different packets in different
ways? How and why? Are these providers operating consistent with the
[FCC’s 2005 Broadband] Policy Statement? . . . Do providers deprioritize
or block packets containing material that is harmful to their commercial
interests, or prioritize packets relating to applications or services in which
they have a commercial interest?
....
We next ask whether the Policy Statement should be amended. . . .
[A]re there specific changes to the Policy Statement that commenters
would recommend? We also ask whether we should incorporate a new
principle of nondiscrimination. If so, how would “nondiscrimination” be
defined, and how would such a principle read? Would it permit any
exclusive or preferential arrangements among network platform or access
providers and content providers?
Finally, does the Commission have the legal authority to enforce the
Policy Statement in the face of particular market failures or other specific
problems? . . . Assuming it is not necessary to adopt rules at this time,
what market characteristics would justify the adoption of rules?86
In asking for comments on this list of network neutrality related questions, the FCC
presumably indicated that it intended to consider the broad range of responses in
engaging in rulemaking on net neutrality issues. Although the FCC received a substantial
number of comments in response to these questions, it never progressed toward a
rulemaking and never issued a notice of proposed rulemaking. Instead, as discussed
below, the FCC chose to proceed via informal adjudication under its seemingly
unfettered ancillary jurisdiction in its August 2008 order regarding Comcast’s
discriminatory network practices.87
Proposed Net Neutrality Legislation
Meanwhile, beginning in 2006, troubled by the potential implications of
the FCC’s removal of common carriage obligations form broadband providers,
open access and net neutrality advocates “prevailed upon members of Congress to
86
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introduce network neutrality legislation.”88 Such legislation would prohibit
broadband providers from discriminating against legal content or applications in
the form of blocking, prioritizing, or degrading such content or applications.89
The most speech-protective of the proposed legislation would prohibit providers
from blocking, impairing, degrading, or discriminating against the ability of any
person to use a broadband connection to access the content or services available
on broadband networks.90
Other proposed net neutrality legislation, such as the Communications
Opportunity, Promotion and Enhancement (COPE) Act of 2006,91 would not directly
prohibit broadband providers from discriminating against content or applications, but
would grant the FCC explicit authority to adjudicate consumer complaints regarding
discrimination and to enforce the principles articulated in the 2005 Broadband Policy
Statement.92 Presumably, the supporters of the COPE Act believed that the FCC does not
currently enjoy such authority and therefore must be granted such authority in order to
adjudicate net neutrality-related complaints.
None of the federal network neutrality bills was passed as of September 2009.
For the time being, it appears that net neutrality advocates will enjoy greater success
advancing their cause with the FCC than with Congress, as I consider in Part II.
II.

The Comcast Adjudication and the FCC’s Regulatory About-Face

In the fall of 2007, Internet users began to suspect that Comcast, the nation’s
second largest broadband provider, was blocking and otherwise discriminating against
legal file-sharing applications.93 With the help of the public interest organizations Free
88
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Press and Public Knowledge, users were able to confirm their suspicions and establish
that Comcast was blocking and degrading the protocols employed by BitTorrent, an open
source program used for quickly distributing large files.94 The question then became:
was Comcast doing anything illegal? If so, what law was it violating? As the provider of
an “information service,” Comcast was subject neither to common
carriage/nondiscrimination obligations, nor to the FCC’s regulatory oversight under Title
II of the Communications Act.95 Although Comcast’s actions arguably violated the
Broadband Policy Statement, FCC Chairman Martin had made clear that the principles
articulated in the Statement were not “rules” or otherwise “enforceable documents.”96
Furthermore, it was not clear how one could frame a complaint alleging a violation of the
Broadband Policy Statement, even assuming its principles were enforceable. While
violations of Title II common carriage obligations could be alleged via “Formal
Complaints,”97 the FCC had not established mechanisms for bringing to its attention
violations of the Broadband Policy Statement.
Undaunted by these procedural uncertainties, in November 2007, Free Press and
Public Knowledge asked the FCC to undertake an investigation into Comcast’s
discriminatory network management practices. They framed their allegations in the form
of a Formal Complaint and Petition for a Declaratory Ruling (notwithstanding the fact
that Formal Complaints were intended for allegations of Title II violations), and alleged
that Comcast was degrading and blocking peer-to-peer file-sharing applications and
withholding information about these actions from Internet subscribers.98 They alleged
that, beginning in August 2007, certain Comcast Internet subscribers who sought to use
peer-to-peer file-sharing applications such as BitTorrent noticed that their file transfers
were being cut off and/or severely degraded by Comcast.99 When these users
complained, Comcast flatly denied that it was blocking, degrading, or otherwise
“shaping” any traffic on its network and blamed the problems that users were
experiencing on the users themselves and on the BitTorrent protocol.100 In October 2007,
however, the Associated Press (AP), together with the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF), produced clear evidence that Comcast had indeed degraded and blocked a variety
94
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of peer-to-peer applications, including those using BitTorrent, Gnutella, FTP, and even
Lotus Notes’s software suite (which is routinely used by businesses to share email,
calendars, and other files).101 In particular, AP reported problems in using BitTorrent to
download copies of the King James Bible from a computer with a Comcast cable
modem.102 EFF, upon further investigation, found that Comcast was employing network
management tools to cause peer-to-peer connections to shut down,103 and intentionally
configuring its network to jam such traffic and to make it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for its subscribers to use such applications.104
Furthermore, Comcast’s method of jamming such applications was designed to hide
from users the fact that it was Comcast itself that was taking actions to discriminate
against such applications.105 When a Comcast user attempted to send packets to others
using certain file-sharing applications, Comcast shut down the connection between that
user and other non-Comcast users by “hacking into its own network and using a
clandestine ‘man in the middle’ tactic whereby each party is sent a communication ‘RST’
(reset) message which falsely tells the other party to shut down the connection.”106 As a
result of such interference, each affected user’s computer received a message invisible to
the user that looked like it came from another, peer computer instructing it to stop
communicating. “But neither message originated from the other computer—it comes
from Comcast.”107 As one commentator characterized Comcast’s interference, “[i]f it
were a telephone conversation, it would be like the operator breaking into the
conversation, telling each talker in the voice of the other: ‘Sorry, I have to hang up.
Good bye.’”108
Free Press and Public Knowledge claimed that Comcast’s action violated the
principles articulated in the Broadband Policy Statement, especially Internet users’
freedom “to access the lawful Internet content of their choice” and to “run applications
and use services of their choice.”109 Comcast eventually acknowledged that it purposely
slowed down some traffic on its network, including some music and movie downloads,
but claimed that it should be permitted to do so in order to direct traffic to prevent
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network clogs.110 It argued that its actions fell within the “reasonable network
management” exception to the freedoms guaranteed to users under the Policy
Statement,111 which, Comcast argued, the Commission recognized was necessary “‘for
the good of all customers.’”112
The FCC’s Order
In its August 1, 2008 informal adjudication on this matter, the FCC sided with the
Internet users.113 The FCC first concluded that it indeed enjoyed jurisdiction to rule on
this matter.114 After establishing its authority to adjudicate, the FCC found that
Comcast’s actions violated the Broadband Policy Statement and did not fall within the
Statement’s exception for “reasonable network management.”115 It concluded that
Comcast’s network management practices were discriminatory and not reasonably
tailored to address Comcast’s concerns about network congestion.116 It found further that
Comcast had an anti-competitive motive to engage in such discrimination, as the filesharing applications against which it discriminated posed a competitive threat to
Comcast’s own video-on-demand service.117 The FCC also found that Comcast’s
disclosures to its subscribers regarding its discriminatory actions were wholly inadequate
and that subscribers could not possibly have learned from Comcast’s disclosures that
such discrimination was occurring.118 I analyze each of these conclusions below.
As a threshold matter, the FCC declared that it enjoyed the broad, general
authority to enforce “federal Internet policy,” which encompassed the power to
adjudicate the present dispute between Free Press and Comcast.119 It grounded its
authority to adjudicate in the broad outlines of federal Internet policy articulated by
Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, in particular, the general policy of
“encourag[ing] the development of technologies [that] maximize user control over what
information is received by individuals . . . who use the Internet.”120 Second, the FCC
explained that when it promulgated its Broadband Policy Statement in 2005, it clearly
asserted its responsibility for enforcing this federal Internet policy.121 In elaborating
upon this policy, the Broadband Policy Statement made clear that the FCC intended to
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“preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet,”122 and
to “preserve and promote the vibrant and open character of the Internet as the
telecommunications marketplace enters the broadband age.”123 In furtherance of those
goals, the FCC expressly instructed broadband providers that they would be required to
ensure that their users enjoyed the freedom to “run applications and use services of their
choice” and to “access the lawful Internet content of their choice.”124 Furthermore, when
it adopted the Broadband Policy Statement, the FCC warned that if it was presented with
“evidence that providers of telecommunications for Internet access . . . [were] violating
these principles, [it would] not hesitate to take action to address that conduct.”125
The FCC further defended its jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute by referring
back to the Brand X decision itself, in which the Supreme Court dismissed criticisms of
the FCC’s decision to exempt broadband providers from common carriage regulations by
explaining that the FCC would retain the power to impose regulatory obligations on
broadband providers “under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and
foreign communications.”126 Under such Title I authority, the FCC explained, it enjoyed
broad authority and jurisdiction over “communication by wire,” including over
Comcast’s provision of broadband Internet access.127 In response to the argument that
the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction must be reasonably ancillary to the effective performance
of something in particular, the FCC explained that that “something” is the federal Internet
policy set forth in the Telecommunications Act.128 The FCC then articulated a host of
other provisions of the Communications Act to which its jurisdiction was also
ancillary.129
Turning to the means it selected to define the contours of national Internet policy
in general and net neutrality norms in particular—via informal adjudication instead of via
rulemaking—the FCC acknowledged the Supreme Court’s mandate130 that it “fill[] in the
interstices of the [Telecommunications Act,] . . . as much as possible, through th[e] quasilegislative promulgation of rules” rather than by case-by-case adjudication.131 It
defended its decision to proceed via adjudication in this case by adverting to the novel,
complex, and variegated nature of Internet traffic management issues, which rendered
case-by-case adjudication preferable to one-size-fits-all rules.132
Moreover, in
furtherance of the national Internet policy set forth in the Telecommunications Act that
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“‘broadband services should exist in a minimal regulatory environment,’”133 the FCC
claimed that proceeding via case-by-case adjudication established a comparatively less
burdensome regulatory environment for broadband providers.134
In addressing the merits of Free Press’s complaint, the FCC found that Comcast’s
network management practices unlawfully discriminated among applications and
protocols by using deep packet inspection technology to peer into Internet users’
communications and terminate communications based on their content.135 The FCC
found that Comcast terminated certain connections when it determined that there were
too many peer-to-peer uploads by sending RST (reset) packets to interrupt and terminate
these communications.136 It held that Comcast’s use of deep packet inspection
technology and Reset Injection was unreasonable, constituted discriminatory censorship
in violation of the principles articulated in the Broadband Policy Statement, and was not
“carefully tailored to [Comcast’s] interest in easing network congestion.”137 In particular,
Comcast’s network practices were overinclusive—not targeting all Internet users who
used substantial bandwidth, but only those who used disfavored applications, regardless
of the level of overall network congestion at the time or whether the user’s particular
geographic area had congested nodes.138 Comcast’s network practices were also
underinclusive, in that even an Internet user using an extraordinary amount of bandwidth
would be left alone by Comcast as long as he or she was not using a disfavored
application like BitTorrent.139 Applying a form of strict scrutiny to Comcast’s network
management practices, the FCC went on to find that Comcast had alternative avenues to
advance its legitimate network management goals that were less restrictive of expression,
including capping individual users’ bandwidth consumption and/or charging overage fees
to high capacity users, instead of punishing anyone who uses disfavored peer-to-peer
technology.140
Finally, the FCC sharply rebuked Comcast for failing to disclose its network
management practices to affected Internet users to the FCC itself.141 To remedy this lack
of meaningful disclosure, the FCC ordered Comcast to:
(1) disclose to the Commission the precise contours of the network
management practices [it was employing] . . . ; (2) submit a
compliance plan . . . that describes how it intends to transition from
discriminatory to nondiscriminatory network management practices
by the end of [2008]; and (3) disclose to the Commission and the
133
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public the details of the network management practices that it
intends to deploy following the termination of its current practices,
including the thresholds that will trigger any limits on customers’
access to bandwidth.142
The FCC, however, declined to adopt generally applicable disclosure requirements—or
any other requirements—regarding network management practices for broadband
providers generally,143 limiting itself to imposing these mandates on Comcast in
particular. The FCC concluded by retaining continuing jurisdiction over this matter and
by urging Free Press and members of the public generally to “keep a watchful eye on
Comcast as it carries out this relief.” 144
Chairman Kevin J. Martin’s Concurring Statement
While concurring generally with the FCC’s order, FCC Chairman Martin was
more willing to articulate broadly-applicable rules for broadband providers and set forth
these rules in a way similar to that applicable under First Amendment scrutiny. He
explained that the FCC was “ready, willing, and able” to enforce the net neutrality
principles articulated in its Broadband Policy Statement, 145 and would conduct its
analysis of whether a broadband provider violated these principles as follows: first, the
FCC would consider “whether the network management practice [was] intended to
distinguish between legal and illegal activity,” such as child pornography or copyrightinfringing content.146 Next, it would consider whether the broadband service provider
had “adequately disclosed its network management practices,” both because Internet
users should be able to rely upon such disclosure so they can make informed decisions
about their choice of broadband provider and because lack of full disclosure is strong
evidence that the practice is unreasonable. 147 Finally, if the FCC were to determine that
the broadband provider arbitrarily degraded or blocked legal content under the guise of
“network management,” it would apply a version of intermediate scrutiny to determine
whether the network management practice “further[ed] an important interest and [was]
carefully tailored to serve that interest.”148
Applying this analysis, Commissioner Martin had no difficulty concluding that
Comcast’s discriminatory blocking of BitTorrent and similar applications was
unreasonable and unlawful. As he explained,
If we aren’t going to stop a company that is looking inside its subscribers’
communications (reading the “packets” they send), blocking that
communication when it uses a particular application regardless of whether
142
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there is congestion on the network, hiding what it is doing by making
consumers think the problem is their own, and lying about it to the public,
what would we stop? Failure to act here would have reasonably led to the
conclusion that new legislation and rules are necessary.149
Because the Commission was “ready, willing and able” to regulate such bad practices by
broadband providers on an informal, ad hoc basis, neither formal rulemaking nor broadly
applicable net neutrality legislation was necessary, according to Martin.150
Commissioner Robert M. McDowell’s Dissent
Commissioner McDowell disagreed with the majority of FCC
Commissioners regarding the FCC’s jurisdiction to adjudicate in these
circumstances. He explained that, “[s]ince the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brand X, we have been busy taking broadband services out of the common
carriage realm of Title II and classifying them as largely unregulated Title I
information services.”151 Accordingly, with respect to Comcast, he concluded,
“we do not have any rules governing Internet network management to enforce.”152
He emphasized that the Broadband Policy Statement principles were not intended
to serve as enforceable rules, and that the FCC had clearly contemplated a
rulemaking proceeding regarding network management practices, as was
evidenced by its adoption of the Broadband Industry Practices Notice of Inquiry
in 2007, the first step in a rulemaking proceeding.153 As McDowell complained,
“no notice of proposed rulemaking, with a chance for public comment, was ever
issued. Nothing regulating Internet network governance has been codified in the
Code of Federal Regulations. In short, we have no rules to enforce.”154
McDowell also sharply criticized the majority’s broad conception of the
FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction, under which “the Commission apparently can do
anything so long as it frames its actions in terms of promoting the Internet or
broadband deployment.”155 He also observed that members of Congress
apparently believed that the FCC did not enjoy the jurisdiction to regulate
broadband providers’ network management practices and accordingly sought
(unsuccessfully, so far) to enact net neutrality legislation that would grant the
FCC such jurisdiction.156
In summary, the FCC Commissioners were sharply divided in their
understanding of whether the FCC had the power to adjudicate in the Comcast
149
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incident, whether the FCC had rules to enforce against Comcast, how the FCC
(and Congress) should proceed in the future in protecting Internet users’ freedom
to communicate, and what level of scrutiny it should apply to allegations of
discrimination by broadband providers.
Process-Based Criticisms of the FCC’s Approach
The FCC’s approach to regulation of broadband providers in its Comcast order is
insufficient to protect Internet users’ free speech rights and is vulnerable to attack on
several fronts. First, as a procedural matter, there are strong arguments that an agency
cannot enforce a policy statement (especially one that it itself declared unenforceable)157
that did not emerge from a notice-and-comment rulemaking.158 As discussed above, FCC
Chairman Martin made clear when adopting the Broadband Policy Statement that “policy
statements do not establish rules nor are they enforceable documents.”159 Courts have
held that agencies “cannot apply or rely upon [such nonbinding policy statements] as law
because a general statement of policy only announces what the agency seeks to establish
as policy.”160 Although agencies enjoy the discretion to act via adjudication instead of
via rulemaking, such adjudications must enforce previously articulated rules or binding
principles. In its Comcast adjudication, the FCC did neither.
Second, the FCC’s adjudication is subject to criticism on the grounds that it relied
entirely on a paper record composed of predominantly self-serving statements by the
parties themselves or other interested parties that were not subject to penalties of perjury
or cross-examination. As Commissioner McDowell complained in his dissent,
[a]ll we have to rely on are the apparently unsigned declarations of three
individuals representing the complainant’s view, some press reports, and
the conflicting declaration of a Comcast employee. The rest of the record
consists purely of differing opinions and conjecture . . . [The Commission
should instead have] conduct[ed] its own factual investigation under its
enforcement powers.”161
The agency’s informal adjudication in Comcast differs markedly from the formal
adjudication mode that is available to the FCC, in which adjudications are held before
one of the FCC’s two full-time administrative law judges, employ a trial and investigative
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staff that is separate from the FCC, and have a variety of procedural requirements.162 The
processes attendant to formal adjudications alleviate many of the concerns inherent in
informal adjudications. As Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai explain,
the trial-type context of formal adjudications, with the parties
presenting evidence and rebutting their opponents’ evidence and
with the hearing officer’s decision based solely on the material
presented at the hearing, alleviates the fear of powerful interests
presenting arguments privately to the decisionmaker and more
generally reduces concerns about bias affecting the agency’s
decision.163
Because the FCC failed to employ formal adjudication and instead employed a mode of
informal adjudication in which it purported to enforce principles and policies it had
previously labeled “non-enforceable,” its process is flawed in many respects.
Although the decision reached by the FCC reprimanding Comcast appears to be
an important step in the right direction, across-the-board regulation of broadband
providers in the form of either legislation or agency rulemaking—both of which were
opposed by a majority of the FCC Commissioners164—is necessary to ensure that
discrimination against content does not occur in the first place. While post hoc
reprimands specifically directed toward one particular company are an important
indication of the FCC’s current approach toward net discrimination, they do not obviate
the need for broadly applicable, ex ante regulation.
III. Too Little, Too Late: The FCC’s Adjudication Actions are Insufficient to Protect
Internet Users’ Freedom of Expression
The Case For Net Neutrality Regulation
Instead of engaging in ad hoc, informal adjudication as an exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction, the FCC should have concluded back in 2002 that broadband providers were
common carriers that were subject at least to nondiscrimination obligations under Title II
of the Communications Act. Congress has the power, in effect, to undo the FCC’s
decision to exempt broadband providers from common carriage obligations and to subject
broadband providers to the nondiscrimination requirements imposed upon common
carriers under Title II.165 As I argue in greater detail in Virtual Freedom: Net Neutrality
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and Free Speech in the Internet Age,166 in the absence of common carriage obligations
imposed on broadband providers, carefully crafted net neutrality legislation is necessary
to protect our free speech interests in the Internet age. Congress enjoys the power to
regulate—or to require the FCC to regulate—broadband providers so as to subject them
to the obligation not to discriminate against the content members of the public seek to
communicate.167 Such regulation would advance the free speech interests of members of
the public and would not infringe the First Amendment rights of broadband providers.
Even assuming that broadband providers enjoy a protectable First Amendment
interest in the functions they perform, net neutrality regulations prohibiting broadband
providers from engaging in discrimination against legal content or applications would be
deemed content-neutral regulations of speech that survive the applicable intermediate
scrutiny. Courts’ analyses of the constitutionality of such regulation would be similar to
the analysis the FCC itself imposed in its Comcast adjudication.168 Such regulation
would advance the substantial government interest of protecting the public’s access to
information and, if the regulation were carefully crafted and appropriately tailored to
advance this interest, it would withstand First Amendment scrutiny.169 Consistent with
the Supreme Court’s analysis in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC,170 in which the
Court recognized the limited First Amendment editorial rights of the cable companies
while upholding regulations requiring them to serve as conduits for content that was not
of their choosing,171 carefully crafted regulation of broadband providers prohibiting them
from unreasonably discriminating against legal content or applications comports with the
First Amendment’s protections. Thus, even if broadband providers were able to convince
a court that their First Amendment interests were implicated by net neutrality regulation,
Turner would counsel in favor of holding that such interests were outweighed by the
countervailing public interest in “‘the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources’”172 and in “public discussion and informed deliberation
[that] . . . democratic government presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to
achieve.”173
Any regulation prohibiting broadband providers from blocking legal content or
applications should also mandate transparency in any such blocking—much like the FCC
mandated in its Comcast adjudication174—requiring broadband providers to inform their
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subscribers when content and/or applications are blocked and the reasons for such
blocking (e.g., the provider claims that the content that was blocked constituted illegal
child pornography or copyright infringing works). Mandating transparency in blocking
will enable users to impose meaningful checks on the blocking decisions of broadband
providers and ensure that such blocking does not mask the provider’s unlawful
discrimination. It is currently quite difficult, if not impossible, for users to discern
whether content or applications have been blocked (as was evident in the case of
Comcast’s discriminatory actions). Indeed, lack of transparency will only compound the
discrimination because users—or, as in Comcast’s case, the broadband provider175—may
attribute the difficulties in access to the blocked content or applications themselves,
instead of placing the blame where it belongs—with their broadband provider. Internet
users enjoy the right to be informed that content or applications have been blocked by
their providers and the reasons for such blocking so they can impose meaningful checks
on broadband providers’ discriminatory actions.
Network operators should be permitted to prioritize types of traffic that inherently
require high bandwidth without discriminating within and among those types of
applications. Operators should be permitted to engage in uniform application-based
prioritizing, in which all applications of a certain type are accorded the same priority of
delivery.176 Under such regulation, broadband providers should not be prohibited from
according higher priority to all Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) packets, for example,
because such packets are latency-sensitive.177 However, broadband providers should be
prohibited from prioritizing within such types of applications so as to favor their affiliated
VoIP applications over those of a rival, as providers have been accused of doing in
discriminating against VoIP provider Vonage while prioritizing and favoring their own
VoIP applications, for example.178 To protect the free flow of information and the
public’s access to information from a wide variety of sources, such discriminatory
prioritization should be prohibited.
In summary, Congress should pass legislation prohibiting (or requiring the FCC to
prohibit) broadband providers from blocking legal content or applications across the
board and from engaging in discriminatory prioritization or degradation of such content
or applications. Such legislation should also mandate transparency in blocking or
degrading, requiring broadband providers to inform Internet users of any content or
applications that were blocked or degraded and the reasons therefor, so that users will be
175
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able to impose meaningful checks on these decisions of broadband providers and ensure
that such actions do not mask unlawful discrimination.
Conclusion
Since the FCC embarked upon the path of removing common
carriage/nondiscrimination obligations from broadband providers in 2002, the rights of
Internet users to communicate on the Internet have been imperiled. The stop-gap
attempts undertaken by the FCC to remedy the problems caused by its decision to
undertake this deregulatory course of action have been insufficient to protect Internet
users’ free speech interests. The Broadband Policy Statement promulgated by the FCC in
2005 does not impose meaningful obligations on broadband providers. Although the
Supreme Court sought to assure Internet users that the FCC would protect their right to
communicate in the broadband realm by exercising its ancillary jurisdiction, the exercise
of such jurisdiction is fraught with procedural and other difficulties, as evidenced by the
FCC’s recent informal adjudication in the Comcast case. Because the FCC has declined
to articulate generally applicable nondiscrimination rules for broadband providers, the
rights of Internet users to communicate in the broadband realm are insufficiently
protected. Broadly applicable regulation or legislation is necessary to guarantee our right
to communicate in the Internet age.
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